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Pennsylvania’s Need for Permanency:
An Argument in Support of Workable
Standards for Representing Children in
Involuntary Termination of Parental
Rights Proceedings
Anne Marie Bingaman*
ABSTRACT
In cases of child abuse and neglect, Pennsylvania’s depen-
dency laws both empower courts to act to protect the child and
offer opportunities to bolster the parent-child relationship.  How-
ever, when courts determine that maintenance of the parent-
child relationship is not in the child’s best interest, termination of
parental rights proceedings play an essential role in freeing the
child for adoption.
Pennsylvania’s General Assembly has recognized that termi-
nation proceedings are both a necessary mechanism for perma-
nency and a significant intrusion in the life of a child.  As a result,
the General Assembly enacted 23 PA. CONST. STAT. § 2313(a), a
provision in the state’s Adoption Act requiring dependency
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courts to appoint legal counsel for children whose parents’ rights
are subject to involuntary termination.  On its face, Section
2313(a) creates a child-centered representation model that ac-
knowledges the importance of giving a voice to children who face
permanent separation from their biological parents.  Inherent
complexities associated with effectively representing children
across the developmental spectrum have, however, illuminated
inadequacies in Section 2313(a)’s framework.
Between March 2017 and the publication of this Comment,
Pennsylvania’s Superior Court has remanded approximately 40
termination decrees based on noncompliance with Section
2313(a).  This Comment argues that the struggles of courts and
legal representatives to consistently apply Section 2313(a)’s rep-
resentation mandate has created additional instability in the lives
of vulnerable children.  After providing an overview of the role
that termination proceedings play in the child welfare system and
discussing the predominant child representation models, this
Comment analyzes Pennsylvania case law that interprets and ap-
plies Section 2313(a).  This Comment concludes by offering prac-
tical recommendations for ways to enhance Section 2313(a)’s
representation scheme, to avoid protracted termination proceed-
ings, and to achieve permanent placements for children.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The relationship that a child shares with his or her biological
parents is foundational and fundamental; a healthy parent-child
bond functions as the child’s earliest source of security and iden-
tity.1  Recognizing the significance of this bond, the Supreme Court
has extended constitutional protection to the parent-child relation-
ship.2  This constitutional protection, however, is not absolute.  In
cases of child abuse and neglect, the state has authority3 to inter-
vene in the parent-child relationship to protect an at-risk child.4
In the most extreme cases, state laws empower courts to termi-
nate the rights of a parent who is unable to provide his or her child
with a safe and healthy home.5  While termination of parental rights
(“TPR”) plays a necessary role in freeing an abused or neglected
child for adoption,6 legal severance of the parent-child bond has a
palpable, everlasting impact on a child’s life.7  Child development
1. See Margaret Beyer & Wallace J. Mlyniec, Lifelines to Biological Parents:
Their Effect on Termination of Parental Rights and Permanence, 20 FAM. L. Q. 233,
237 (1986) (explaining the important role that a child’s biological family plays in
the child’s development of identity and self-perception).
2. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983) (discussing the “intangible
fibers” that exist between a parent and child); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
758–59 (1982) (explaining that the parent-child relationship is a “commanding”
interest).
3. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944) (establishing that states
have a “wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority”); see
also LISA KELLY & KIMBERLY AMBROSE, REPRESENTING YOUTH 6 (2017) (ex-
plaining the concept of parens patriae, a doctrine in which the state acts as “com-
mon guardian of the community” and has “the authority to intervene in the
parent-child relationship”).
4. Tracey B. Harding, Note, Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights: Re-
form Is Needed, 39 BRANDEIS L. J. 895, 895 (2001) (explaining that the fundamen-
tal right of parenthood is suspended when parents abuse or neglect their children,
in which case “[s]tates have a compelling right to enter the family sphere and pro-
ceed according to the best interests of the child”).
5. Jamie D. Manasco, Parent-Child Relationships: The Impetus Behind the
Gregory K. Decision, 17 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 243, 246 (1993).
6. Id. at 247.
7. See In re B.L.L., 787 A.2d 1007, 1013 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (explaining that
TPR “ends the parent/child relationship as unequivocally as the death of the
child”).
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research shows that, despite inadequacies of a child’s parent, TPR
creates an experience of parental loss for the child.8
Recognizing these profound impacts, most states have enacted
legislation guaranteeing some form of representation for children
subject to child welfare proceedings, including TPR cases.9  How-
ever, despite the consensus that representation for children is nec-
essary,10 significant debate exists among courts, within legislatures,
and between scholars regarding who should represent a child and
how a child’s legal representative should function.11  Most state
laws incorporate components of two representation models12:  the
“best interest” model13 and the “legal interest” model.14
In 1980, Pennsylvania’s General Assembly enacted 23 PA.
CONST. STAT. § 2313(a), a statute articulating the state’s approach
to representation for children involved in involuntary TPR pro-
8. Kerri M. Schneider & Vicky Phares, Coping with Parental Loss Because of
Termination of Parental Rights, 84 CHILD WELFARE 819, 820 (2005) (comparing
the sense of loss a child experiences as a result of TPR to the loss a child exper-
iences as a result of divorce or the death of the child’s parents).
9. See generally CHILDREN’S ADVOCACY INSTITUTION, ET AL., A CHILD’S
RIGHT TO COUNSEL: A NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON LEGAL REPRESENTATION
FOR ABUSED & NEGLECTED CHILDREN (3d ed. 2012), https://bit.ly/2tjvSEL [https:/
/perma.cc/N6BL-UFBU] [hereinafter NATIONAL REPORT CARD] (presenting an
overview of the representation models used across the United States and “grad-
ing” each representation model); CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, REP-
RESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT PROCEEDINGS
(2017), https://bit.ly/2TIITDG [https://perma.cc/NC3S-4AS3] [hereinafter REPRE-
SENTATION OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT PROCEEDINGS] (providing a
summary of representation models used in each state and providing citations to
each state’s statutory scheme).
10. CHILD WELFARE LEGAL REPRESENTATION: ABA ATTORNEY STAN-
DARDS 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) [hereinafter ABA ATTORNEY STANDARDS].
11. KELLY & AMBROSE, supra note 3, at 47 (discussing the “proliferation” of
representation schemes and systems that exist throughout the United States); Lisa
Kelly & Alicia LeVezu, Until the Client Speaks: Reviving the Legal-Interest Model
for Preverbal Children, 50 FAM. L. Q. 383, 383 (2016) (describing the “widespread
confusion and debate about the role of attorneys appointed to represent
children”).
12. See NATIONAL REPORT CARD, supra note 9, for a summary on represen-
tation schemes across the United States.
13. See Suparna Malempati, Beyond Paternalism: The Role of Counsel for
Children in Abuse and Neglect Proceedings, 11 U.N.H. L. REV. 97, 113 (2013)
[hereinafter Malempati, Beyond Paternalism] (“The best-interest lawyer must gen-
erally substitute his or her own judgment about what outcome would be best for
the child rather than receive direction from the child as to what the child desires
the outcome to be.”).
14. See KELLY & AMBROSE, supra note 3, at 48 (explaining that the “legal
interest” model, which is also called the “stated interest” or “client-directed
model,” requires courts to appoint an attorney who is “bound by the Rules of
Professional Conduct”).
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ceedings.15  Section 2313(a) requires courts to appoint counsel for a
child who is subject to an involuntary TPR proceeding in which at
least one parent is contesting the termination.16  In construing Sec-
tion 2313(a), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court clarified that the
statute requires courts to appoint a “lawyer who represents the
child’s legal interests, and who is directed by the child.”17  Addi-
tionally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that, if the
child’s expressed desires conflict with the outcome that is in the
child’s best interest, the court must appoint both a client-directed
attorney and a best interest advocate.18
While Section 2313(a), on its face, creates a child-centered rep-
resentation model and acknowledges the importance of giving a
voice to children who are facing permanent separation from their
biological parents, trial courts’ application of the statute has gener-
ated troubling instability:  between January 2017 and the publica-
tion of this Comment, the Pennsylvania Superior Court heard
approximately 170 TPR appeals addressing, among other issues,
whether the trial court had appointed adequate representation for
the affected children.19  In approximately 40 cases, the Superior
Court remanded the TPR decree for further proceedings, determin-
ing that the trial court failed to discern whether a child’s legal and
best interest diverged and, therefore, failed to satisfy Section
2313(a)’s mandate.20
15. 23 PA. CONST. STAT. § 2313(a) (2014).
16. Id. From here forward, any reference to “termination of parental rights
proceedings” or “TPR” is to involuntary termination proceedings; 23 PA. CONST.
STAT. § 2313(a) applies only to involuntary termination proceedings.  Children are
not granted the same right to counsel in voluntary terminations, terminations to
which the child’s biological parents’ consent. Id.
17. In re Adoption of L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172, 180 (Pa. 2017) (applying Section
2313(a)).
18. In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1082 (Pa. 2018), petition for cert. denied, T.H.-H.
v. Allegheny Cty. Off. of Children, Youth and Families, 139 S. Ct. 1187 (Feb. 19,
2019) (No. 18-6997) (establishing that, “where there is a conflict between the
child’s legal interests and his best interests, an attorney-guardian ad litem . . . who
advocates for the child’s best interests, cannot simultaneously represent the child’s
legal interests”).
19. See, e.g., In re D.L.B., 166 A.3d 322 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 15, 2017); In re
C.P.W., Nos. 267–279 WDA 2017, 2017 WL 2116955 (Pa. Super. Ct. May 15, 2017);
see also infra Part III for a further discussion and additional case citations.
20. See, e.g., In re P.G.F., No. 1464 WDA 2018, 2019 WL 1199986, at *3–4 (Pa.
Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2019) (determining that, although the child’s attorney met with
the child and was present at the TPR hearing, the attorney “did not argue Child’s
preferred outcome” or indicate that the child was “unable to express his preferred
outcome” and remanding the case for further proceedings); In re N.S.S., No. 1342
MDA 2017, 2018 WL 831827 (Pa. Super. Ct. Feb. 13, 2018) (remanding the TPR
decree after finding that the trial court failed to appoint separate counsel to re-
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Collectively, the cases interpreting and applying Section
2313(a) indicate that Pennsylvania courts lack a unified understand-
ing of how to implement the statute’s representation mandate.21
The purpose of this Comment is to demonstrate that, without a co-
hesive procedure for identifying and communicating a child’s legal
interests, Pennsylvania’s representation mandate can prolong and
complicate TPR proceedings, effectively increasing the instability
that children face.22
Part II of this Comment presents an overview of the ways in
which the nation’s unfolding understanding of child abuse and neg-
lect has influenced Pennsylvania’s approach to TPR proceedings.23
Part II also presents an overview of the representation models
states use in child welfare proceedings, with a particular focus on
how these models are reflected in Section 2313(a).24  Finally, Part II
analyzes Pennsylvania case law interpreting and applying Section
2313(a) to show the pressing need to create processes and proce-
dures for discerning and representing a child’s legal interest.25  Part
III responds to this need by presenting techniques for working with
vulnerable children and recommends practical, standardized proce-
dures for representing minors in TPR proceedings.26
II. BACKGROUND
A. Focusing on Children: TPR and the Shift Toward
Permanency Planning
Awareness of the causes of, effects of, and solutions for child
abuse and neglect has developed as part of a national conversation
regarding how to listen and respond to the needs of America’s chil-
dren.27  In the last 50 years, the country’s approach to child welfare
present the child’s legal interests); see also infra Part III for a further discussion
and additional case citations.
21. See, e.g., In re A.M.R., No. 1367 EDA 2018, 2018 WL 5905934, at *2–3
(Pa. Super. Ct. Nov. 9, 2018); In re A.L.M.F., Nos. 741, 43, 2018 WL 4907783, at *3
(Pa. Super. Ct. Oct. 10, 2018); In re T.M.W., No. 397 WDA 2018, 2018 WL
4234137, at *2–5 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sep. 6, 2018).
22. See, e.g., In re Q.R.D., No. 1060 MDA 2018, 2018 WL 6735024, at *4 (Pa.
Super. Ct. Dec. 24, 2018) (finding that the lower court had incorrectly applied Sec-
tion 2313(a) and remanding the case for further proceedings, while acknowledging
that the court also “prolong[ed] the uncertainty of the [c]hild’s future”).
23. See infra Part II.A.
24. See infra Part II.B.
25. See infra Part II.C.
26. See infra Part III.
27. See generally LEROY ASHBY, ENDANGERED CHILDREN: DEPENDENCY,
NEGLECT, AND ABUSE IN AMERICAN HISTORY (Joseph M. Hawes & N. Ray Hiner
eds., 1997) (outlining the nation’s understanding of and responses to issues of child
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legislation has coalesced around the idea that children need stabil-
ity and permanency to thrive.28  While child welfare issues are a
matter of state law, federal legislation promoting permanency plan-
ning29 has had a significant impact on state intervention and repre-
sentation schemes.30  This federal legislation provides a backdrop
for understanding the important role that TPR proceedings play on
the state level and underpins the need to find effective ways to re-
present the voices of affected children.31
Additionally, the federal statutory provisions32 governing rep-
resentation of children in abuse and neglect proceedings have influ-
enced the conversation regarding who should represent children
and how children should be represented.33  The ongoing dialogue
continues to inform Pennsylvania’s approach34 to representing chil-
abuse, neglect, and dependency throughout the history of the country); see also
infra Part II(A)(1) (setting forth the major “eras” of the country’s responses to
child abuse and neglect).
28. See Karen Spar, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30759, IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT (P.L. 105-89) 1 (2004), https://bit.ly/
2ByY4YN [https://perma.cc/V32E-VENQ] [hereinafter IMPLEMENTATION OF
ASFA] (describing the purposes of the Adoption and Safe Families Act which
Congress enacted in 1997 and which is “considered the most sweeping change in
federal child welfare law since 1980”).  The Adoption and Safe Families Act, codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1305 et seq., focused on expediating the process of permanent
placement for children in the child welfare system. Id.  See also Martin Guggen-
heim, The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the Termination of Parental Rights
to Children in Foster Care—An Empirical Analysis in Two States, 29 FAM. L. Q.
121, 124 n.10 (1995) (citing the psychological research of Joseph Goldstein, Anna
Freud, and Albert J. Solnit which “criticized the foster care system because it re-
sulted in stress to children who were continually separated, first from their biologi-
cal parents, and then from successive parental figures in foster care placements”).
29. See Leroy H. Pelton, Beyond Permanency Planning: Restructuring the
Public Child Welfare System, 36 SOC. WORK 337, 337 (1991) (defining “perma-
nency planning” as the philosophy that “every child has a right to a permanent and
stable home, preferably his or her own, and that a plan should be made for every
child in foster care for a more permanent living arrangement”).
30. See KELLY & AMBROSE, supra note 3, at 33 (observing that the common-
alities between state dependency systems are primarily a result of the federal stat-
utes providing funding for state statutes that comply with federal regulatory
schemes).
31. Id. at 38 (explaining that federal statutes “create timelines that . . . place
pressure upon parents to remedy their problems or face the possible termination
of their parental rights”).
32. See infra Part II.B. (reviewing the federal statutory provisions governing
representation of children in dependency proceedings).
33. See supra note 30 and accompanying text; see also Malempati, Beyond
Paternalism, supra note 13, at 109–10 (explaining that federal legislation “imposed
the requirement that all children in abuse and neglect proceedings be represented”
but also acknowledging that the flexibility and open spaces in the federal legisla-
tion has resulted in some state-to-state variation).
34. See infra Part II.C. (discussing Pennsylvania’s representation scheme for
children subject to contested involuntary TPR proceedings).
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dren in TPR proceedings, particularly in the midst of the confusion
surrounding the application of Section 2313(a).35
1. A National Perspective
Early child welfare interventions focused primarily on mitigat-
ing the effects of poverty.36  In colonial America, local governments
relied on indenture, a process through which the government sepa-
rated dependent37 children from their indigent parents and placed
them with families who provided food, clothing, shelter, and educa-
tion.38  In exchange, children were obligated to work for and to
serve the families with whom they were placed.39
In the early 1800s, governments and private organizations ex-
panded child welfare interventions to address parental neglect but,
nonetheless, remained primarily focused on alleviating the effects
of poverty.40  State and local governments, as well as private chari-
table organizations, placed neglected children in orphan houses or
other institutional settings.41  However, by the late 1800s, these in-
stitutional placements faced increasing criticism.42  Private charities
35. See infra Part III for a discussion on application of Section 2313(a)’s rep-
resentation mandate.
36. KELLY & AMBROSE, supra note 3, at 5 (explaining that early American
child welfare interventions “primarily focused upon the children of the poor”).
37. LEROY H. PELTON, FOR REASONS OF POVERTY 2 (1989) (defining depen-
dent children as children “who are dependent upon society for financial support,
either because their families are destitute or because they were orphaned”).
38. Tim Hasci, From Indenture to Family Foster Care: A Brief History of Child
Placing, 74 CHILD WELFARE 162, 163–65 (1995) (defining indenture and explain-
ing its role in early American society); ASHBY, supra note 27, at 6 (setting forth
common terms of indenture agreements and outlining the role that such agree-
ments played in a society that was “virtually without children’s institutions”).
39. Hasci, supra note 38, at 163.
40. Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights, 35 STAN. L. REV. 423,
435 (1983) (explaining that “neglect officially replaced poverty as the legal basis
for depriving parents of custody of their children” but that “for the most part pov-
erty was simply equated with neglect”).
41. Judith Areen, Intervention Between the Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of
the State’s Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L. J. 887, 904 (1975)
(explaining that, after New York’s legislature adopted the view that almshouses
and other institutional placements were the best method of taking care of depen-
dent children, other local and state governments began using similar institutional
interventions); Hasci, supra note 38, at 166 (explaining that “between 1830 and
1860 orphan asylums became the nation’s predominant method of caring for de-
pendent children”).
42. Hasci, supra note 38, at 166. See also ASHBY, supra note 27, at 34 (outlin-
ing criticisms of institutional placements for dependent and neglected children, in-
cluding overcrowding and lack of adequate parental care).
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and welfare agencies advocated for the deinstitutionalization of de-
pendent children in favor of placement with families.43
Beginning in the early 1900s, states increasingly focused on
child welfare issues and initiated organized interventions, which in-
cluded financial support programs44 for poor families and juvenile
courts that functioned as centralized agencies for addressing the
“problem of the dependent child.”45  The development of juvenile
courts marked a significant increase in state involvement in private
family life.46
Although there was a brief lull in the nation’s focus on child
abuse and neglect during the mid-1900s, the 1960s marked another
resurgence in national awareness of child welfare issues.47  Sparked
by medical research that introduced the concept of “battered chil-
dren,”48 child abuse and neglect became a national social issue.49
The medical profession’s focus on child abuse as “a set of symptoms
associated with a disease, namely, inadequate parenting” precipi-
43. Hasci, supra note 38, at 166 (discussing the development of “the idea of
placing children in homes rather than institutions” and defining the concept as
“placing-out”); ASHBY, supra note 27, at 35 (discussing the evolution of the “plac-
ing-out” movement and explaining that the push for private family placements for
dependent children arose “out of fears of the growing urban underclass”).
44. Hilary Baldwin, Termination of Parental Rights: Statistical Study and Pro-
posed Solutions, 28 J. LEGIS. 239, 241 (2002) (explaining that many states imple-
mented social welfare policies that promoted the “preservation of the natural
family” by providing poor families with “income supplements called Mother’s
Pensions”).
45. ASHBY, supra note 27, at 82.  An advocate of the juvenile court movement
explained that the fundamental idea of juvenile courts is “a return to paternalism,
it is the acknowledgement by the State of its relationship as the parent to every
child within its borders.” Id.
46. Id. at 81 (providing an overview of juvenile courts in America and ex-
plaining that all but three states developed juvenile courts by 1920).
47. Id. at 101, 125 (contrasting the lack of national focus on child welfare is-
sues between 1920 and 1960 to the “explosion” of interest in children’s issues be-
tween the 1960s and 1980s).
48. ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY 169–70 (2004) (discussing the
1962 publication of the “landmark article, ‘The Battered-Child Syndrome,’” in
which author C. Henry Kempe discussed “nonaccidental physical injury to a child”
by the child’s parents, called for temporary separation of the abused child from his
or her parents, and “appeared to favor termination of parental rights if abuse
continued”).
49. PELTON, FOR REASONS OF POVERTY, supra note 37, at 23 (explaining that
the publication of “The Battered-Child Syndrome” attracted an “enormous
amount of professional and media interest”).
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tated the development of child abuse reporting laws50 and eventu-
ally attracted the attention of federal legislators.51
In 1974, Congress passed the Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act (CAPTA),52 the federal government’s first major
legislative scheme focused on preventing child abuse and neglect.53
CAPTA required states to set forth specific definitions of child
abuse and to enact protective custody laws to be eligible for federal
child abuse prevention funding.54  CAPTA effectively “shifted the
emphasis of state laws away from simply reporting” child abuse and
neglect and instead incentivized states to implement interventions
and treatment programs.55
Since CAPTA’s enactment, subsequent federal legislation has
reflected a “conceptual framework”56 of “permanency planning.”57
The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980
(AACWA)58 “‘de-emphasize[d] the use of foster care and en-
courage[d] greater efforts to place children in permanent
homes.’”59  The AACWA requires states to use “reasonable ef-
forts” to “preserve and reunify families.”60  However, in circum-
50. PLECK, supra note 48, at 171; id. at 173 (“Between 1963 and 1967, every
state passed a child abuse reporting bill, usually after lobbying by pediatricians.”).
51. Id. at 175–76 (outlining the relationship between medical conceptualiza-
tions and treatment of child abuse and federal involvement in the traditionally
state-controlled sphere of child welfare interventions).
52. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4
(1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5107 (2012)).
53. See John E. B. Myers, A Short History of Child Protection in America, 42
FAM. L. Q. 449, 456–57 (2008) (explaining that, before 1974, the “federal govern-
ment played a useful but minor role in child protection” but that “Congress as-
sumed a leadership role with the passage of the Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act of 1974”).
54. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40899, THE CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION AND
TREATMENT ACT (CAPTA): BACKGROUND, PROGRAMS, AND FUNDING 3 (2009),
http://bit.ly/2Icbyj8 [https://perma.cc/MCU8-GELB] (explaining that States receiv-
ing CAPTA funding are required to “define ‘child abuse and neglect’ to be consis-
tent with [CAPTA] . . .[which defines the term] as ‘at a minimum, any recent act or
failure to act on the part of a parent or caretaker, which results in death, serious
physical or emotional harm, sexual abuse or exploitation, or an act or failure to act
which presents an imminent risk of serious harm’”) (citing CAPTA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 5106(g) (2012)).
55. Baldwin, supra note 44, at 246–47.
56. ASHBY, supra note 27, at 140.
57. Pelton, Beyond Permanency Planning, supra note 29, at 337 (“The perma-
nency planning philosophy is that every child has a right to a permanent and stable
home, preferably his or her own, and that a plan should be made for every child in
foster care for a more permanent living arrangement.”).
58. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272,
94 Stat. 500 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 620 (2012)).
59. Baldwin, supra note 44, at 252 (internal citation omitted).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\124-2\DIK204.txt unknown Seq: 11 11-FEB-20 11:05
2020] PENNSYLVANIA’S NEED FOR PERMANENCY 441
stances warranting separation of a child from his or her biological
parents, the AACWA requires states to “develop a case plan . . .
detailing . . . what steps would be taken to return the child home or
place the child up for adoption.”61
Congress most notably emphasized the importance of perma-
nency efforts by enacting the Adoption and Safe Families Act of
1997 (ASFA).62  ASFA calls for development of accelerated time-
lines focused on permanent placements to keep children from
spending long periods of time in the foster care system.63  As a re-
sult of ASFA’s push for permanency, TPR proceedings play a cen-
tral role by freeing children for adoption;64 ASFA requires states to
consider terminating a parent’s rights when his or her child remains
in foster care for 15 out of 22 months.65
2. Pennsylvania’s Approach
Both the AACWA and ASFA influenced the development of
child welfare and dependency laws in many states, including Penn-
sylvania,66 by incentivizing legislation focused on promoting perma-
nent placements for children.67  Outlining the statutes’ impacts, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court explained:
61. Baldwin, supra note 44, at 252.
62. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat.
2115 (1997) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1305 et seq. (2012)).
63. See KELLY & AMBROSE, supra note 3, at 38 (explaining that the AACWA
was “passed in reaction to ‘foster care drift’”).  “Foster Care Drift” describes the
idea that, after being removed from the homes of their biological parents, “many
children were being harmed by a system in which they stayed indefinitely and
drifted from one home to another, without close monitoring of their cases and
without plans for more permanent and stable living arrangements.” PELTON, FOR
REASONS OF POVERTY, supra note 37, at 79.
64. Jennifer Ayres Hand, Note, Preventing Undue Terminations: A Critical
Evaluation of the Length-of-Time-Out-of-Custody Ground for Termination of Pa-
rental Rights, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1251, 1259 (1996).
65. See IMPLEMENTATION OF ASFA, supra note 28, at 6 (explaining that
“[o]ne of the most significant provisions of the 1997 law requires states to initiate
proceedings for the termination of parental rights . . . for children who have been
in foster care for 15 of the most recent 22 months . . . .”).
66. See In re C.B., 861 A.2d 287, 295 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (“Due to the re-
quirements of the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act (“ASFA”) . . . and to
obtain vital federal funding, the legislature amended the Pennsylvania Juvenile Act
. . . .”).
67. See D.H.S. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND
STATE LEGISLATION GOVERNING PERMANENCE FOR CHILDREN I-4–I-5 (June 30,
1999) (summarizing the ways in which federal legislation, like the AACWA and
ASFA, encourage child welfare practices designed to “facilitate more timely place-
ment of children into foster and adoptive homes” and to address “critical perma-
nency issues in child welfare and the law”).
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It has been the national, State and local policy for many years . . .
to remove children from foster placement limbo . . . .  States such
as Pennsylvania, which participate in the program[s], are re-
quired to make reasonable efforts to return the child to its home
following foster placement, but failing to accomplish this due to
the failure of the parent to benefit by such reasonable efforts, to
move toward termination of parental rights and placement of the
child through adoption.68
Pennsylvania’s adoption and TPR laws, therefore, reflect the fed-
eral government’s call to minimize the deference previously given
to parental rights and to instead establish “unequivocally that the
goals for children in the child welfare system are safety, permanency
and well-being.”69
Pennsylvania’s Juvenile Act70 sets forth the legal procedures
for initiating a child welfare intervention.71  The Juvenile Act estab-
lishes the definition of a “dependent child”72 and outlines the
grounds for removing a dependent child from the child’s par-
ent(s).73  In alignment with ASFA, the Juvenile Act requires child
welfare agencies to initiate TPR proceedings after a dependent
child has been outside the care of his or her biological parent for at
least 15 out of 22 months.74
Pennsylvania’s Adoption Act75 governs the technical and pro-
cedural requirements for TPR proceedings.76  Though parents can
voluntarily relinquish their rights, Pennsylvania law also creates
procedures for termination without parental consent.77  Involuntary
TPR proceedings serve the purpose of “free[ing] the child for adop-
tion” when it is in a child’s best interest to be placed outside the
68. In re B.L.L., 787 A.2d 1007, 1016 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001).
69. C.B., 861 A.2d at 295 (quoting In Interest of Lilley, 719 A.2d 327, 334 n.5
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1998)).
70. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 6301 et seq. (2016).
71. Id. § 6351.
72. Id. § 6302 (defining ten categories under which courts can adjudicate chil-
dren dependent, the broadest category being a child who “is without proper care
or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control nec-
essary for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals”).
73. Id. § 6351(a)(2).
74. Id. § 6351(f)(9).
75. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2501 et seq. (2016).
76. See, e.g., 23 PA. CONST. STAT. § 2511 (2016) (setting forth the grounds for
involuntary TPR); 23 PA. CONST. STAT. § 2512 (2016) (setting forth the process
through which a party may file a petition for involuntary TPR); 23 PA. CONST.
STAT. § 2513 (2016) (explaining the procedures required for scheduling and giving
notice of an involuntary TPR proceeding).
77. OFFICE OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE COURTS & ADMIN. OFFICE
OF PA. COURTS, PENNSYLVANIA DEPENDENCY BENCHBOOK 17-1 (3d ed. 2019)
[hereinafter PA. DEPENDENCY BENCHBOOK].
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biological home but the child’s parents refuse to consent to the ter-
mination of their rights.78  While a Pennsylvania court cannot ter-
minate a parent’s rights “solely on the basis of environmental
factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing
and medical care,”79 Pennsylvania’s TPR statute sets forth nine
grounds on which the court can involuntarily terminate a parent’s
rights.80
An involuntary TPR proceeding begins when a child welfare
agency or other party81 files a TPR petition,82 which must clearly
set forth facts that substantiate and serve as the basis for one of the
nine grounds of termination.83  During a TPR hearing, both Penn-
sylvania law and federal law require the judge to determine
whether the TPR petition and testimonial evidence establish one of
the nine grounds for termination by clear and convincing evi-
dence.84  Additionally, the judge must assess the effect that the pro-
posed termination is likely to have on the child by carefully
considering the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional
needs, as well as general welfare implications.85  Pennsylvania case
78. In re Adoption of A.B.M., 812 A.2d 659, 665 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).
79. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2511(b) (2016).
80. Id. § 2511.  Examples of grounds for involuntary termination include:
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of
the parent [which causes] the child to be without essential parental care,
control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and
the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal can-
not or will not be remedied by the parent.
. . . (5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the
court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at
least six months, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of
the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those
conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance
reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions
which led to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable
period of time and termination of the parental rights would best serve the
needs and welfare of the child.
Id.
81. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2512(a) (2016).  A TPR petition can be filed by a
parent, an agency, an individual who has custody or is standing in loco parentis to
the child and who has filed a report of intention to adopt, or an attorney or guard-
ian ad litem representing a child who has been adjudicated dependent. Id.
82. PA. DEPENDENCY BENCHBOOK, supra note 77, at 17-3.
83. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2512(b) (2016).
84. See In re B.L.L., 787 A.2d 1007, 1013 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (explaining
that “termination of parental rights for all practical purposes ends the parent/child
relationship . . . and for that reason, the United States Supreme Court, in Santosky
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), set the standard of proof at clear and convincing
evidence”).
85. See PA. DEPENDENCY BENCHBOOK, supra note 77, at 17-14; 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 2511(b) (2016).
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law establishes that this assessment essentially consists of an exami-
nation of the emotional bond that exists between the parent and
child.86  Though Pennsylvania law does not require courts to order
a “formal bonding evaluation,” the TPR hearing record must none-
theless show that the parties have presented evidence detailing the
likely effect that the proposed TPR would have on the child.87
If the judge determines that the petitioning party has estab-
lished a ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence,
the judge will issue a TPR decree.88  A TPR decree extinguishes all
of a biological parent’s legal rights to his or her child, including the
right to be notified of and to object to future adoption hearings.89
B. Acknowledging the Child’s Voice: Toward Client-Directed
Models for Representing Children in Involuntary
TPR Proceedings
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has described TPR as “one
of the most severe steps the court can take,” acknowledging that
the “finality of the termination . . . [has] great emotional impact on
both the child and the parent.”90  Unlike the juvenile delinquency
system where children have a constitutionally-protected right to
counsel,91 the Supreme Court has not yet recognized a right to
counsel for children subject to dependency and TPR proceedings.92
However, because of the profound impact of child welfare interven-
tions,93 both federal and state laws grant statutory representation
rights to children throughout the dependency and termination
processes.94
Along with its push for permanency, CAPTA requires partici-
pating states to appoint a guardian ad litem (GAL)95 to represent
children involved in abuse and neglect cases, including TPR pro-
86. See, e.g., In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008).
87. PA. DEPENDENCY BENCHBOOK, supra note 77, at 17-15.
88. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2512 (2016).
89. Id.
90. In re Adoption of Sarver, 281 A.2d 890, 891 (Pa. 1971).
91. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 37 (1967) (guaranteeing the right to counsel
for juveniles in delinquency proceedings).
92. Barbara Ann Atwood, Representing Children: The Ongoing Search for
Clear and Workable Standards, 19 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 183, 187 (2005).
93. See Adoption of Sarver, 281 A.2d at 891.
94. NATIONAL REPORT CARD, supra note 9, at 5 (explaining that the depen-
dency process can involve years of hearings and includes various stages and legal
proceedings including TPR hearings).
95. Id. at 11 (defining a GAL as “an individual appointed by the court to
represent a child in court proceedings” who “may or may not be an attorney and
may advocate for the child’s best interests, or their wishes, or both”).
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ceedings.96  In a statement supporting CAPTA’s GAL mandate,
Representative Brian Fraser explained that the general consensus is
that children do have “certain rights and privileges,” which a GAL
is responsible for protecting.97
While requiring a court-appointed GAL to develop a personal
understanding of the child’s needs and to provide the court with
recommendations concerning the best interests of the child,98
CAPTA’s representation mandate does not strictly define a GAL’s
qualifications and responsibilities.99  Importantly, as long as the
GAL receives appropriate training in child development, CAPTA
does not require the GAL to be an attorney.100
Over half of the states have built upon CAPTA’s requirements
and enacted statutes requiring a child’s representative to be a li-
censed attorney.101  Significant variation exists, however, regarding
the role that a child’s attorney is required to play.102  This variation
derives primarily from adaptations of two models of representation:
the “best interest” model and the “legal interest” model.103
1. The “Best Interests” Model
Under the best interests model, the child’s attorney functions
in a traditional GAL role; although the attorney may take the
child’s expressed interests into account, the attorney primarily func-
96. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii) (2016) (“To be eligible to receive a
grant under this section, a State shall . . . [provide assurance] that[,] in every case
involving a victim of child abuse or neglect which results in a judicial proceeding, a
guardian ad litem . . . shall be appointed to represent the child in such
proceeding.”).
97. To Establish a National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect, Hearing on
H.R. 5379, H.R. 10552, and H.R. 10968 Before the Select Subcomm. On Educ. of
the Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 93rd Cong. 19 (1973) (statement of Brian Fraser).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii)(I)(II) (2016).
99. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, ENHANCED
RESOURCE GUIDELINES 46 (2016), https://bit.ly/2UWRRx4 [https://perma.cc/
T96G-57PH].
100. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii) (2016).
101. KELLY & AMBROSE, supra note 3, at 48 (summarizing a survey of state
laws governing representation of children in child welfare cases and concluding
that 61% of states require children to be represented by an attorney); see generally
REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT PROCEEDINGS, supra
note 9 (presenting an overview of representation statues in all 50 states).
102. KELLY & AMBROSE, supra note 3, at 47 (describing the various forms
that a child’s representative can take, including GALs that are lawyers, GALs that
are non-lawyers, and attorneys tasked with representing the child’s “position and
interests”); Atwood, supra note 92, at 193 (noting a “lack of uniformity . . . with
respect to the professional role of children’s representatives”).
103. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN, NACC RECOM-
MENDATIONS FOR REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT
CASES 5 (2001).
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tions as an officer of the court and is not bound by the wishes of the
child.104  The attorney is required to determine the outcome that is
in the child’s best interest and may substitute his or her own judg-
ment when making recommendations to the court.105  Recognizing
the “unique vulnerability” of children who are subject to depen-
dency hearings, particularly in cases that culminate in TPR pro-
ceedings, proponents of the best interests model view the attorney
as a protector of and decision-maker for the child.106
2. The “Legal Interests” Model
Unlike the attorney’s role in a best interest model, the attorney
in a legal interest model functions in the role of a traditional attor-
ney and owes a duty of loyalty and confidentiality solely to the child
client.107  The legal interest model critiques and abandons the “pa-
ternalistic” approach of the best interest model and operates out of
an understanding that the child’s perspectives and desires are valua-
ble and should not be overpowered by the attorney’s own opin-
ions.108  Also described as a “client-directed”109 or “stated-
interest”110 model, the legal interest model requires attorneys to
“advocate for the [child’s] expressed preferences and positions.”111
In a 1996 resolution, the American Bar Association published
standards for child welfare legal representation (“ABA Attorney
Standards”).112  The ABA Attorney Standards endorse a predomi-
104. ABA ATTORNEY STANDARDS, supra note 10, at 3; Alberto Bernabe, The
Right to Counsel Denied: Confusing the Roles of Lawyers and Guardians, 43 LOY.
U. CHI. L. J. 833, 836 (2012); NATIONAL REPORT CARD, supra note 9, at 11.
105. Bernabe, supra note 104, at 836.
106. Atwood, supra note 92, at 190; see also ALA. CODE § 12-15-304 (2018) as
an example of a best-interest model of representation.  The statute provides, “[i]n
all dependency and termination of parental rights proceedings, the juvenile court
shall appoint a guardian ad litem for a child who is a party to the proceedings and
whose primary responsibility shall be to protect the best interests of the child.” Id.
107. NATIONAL REPORT CARD, supra note 9, at 11; KELLY & AMBROSE,
supra note 3, at 48.
108. Sarah H. Ramsey, Representation of the Child in Protection Proceedings:
The Determination of Decision-Making Capacity, 17 FAM. L. Q. 287, 292 (1983).
109. DONALD N. DUQUETTE, CHILDREN’S JUSTICE 21 (2016).
110. KELLY & AMBROSE, supra note 3, at 48.
111. NATIONAL REPORT CARD, supra note 9, at 11.  See also LA. SUP. CT. R.
XXXIII, Part III, Subpart II, Standard 4, for an example of a “legal interest” ap-
proach for representation of a child (“Counsel for a child . . . should [d]etermine
the client’s desires and preferences in a developmentally appropriate and cultur-
ally sensitive manner . . . and [a]dvocate for the desires and expressed preferences
of the child and follow the child’s direction throughout the case in a developmen-
tally appropriate matter.”).
112. See generally ABA ATTORNEY STANDARDS, supra note 10 (setting forth
standards for representation of children in cases of abuse and neglect, specifically
including TPR proceedings).
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nately legal interest model,113 calling for a “lawyer who provides
legal services for a child and who owes the same duties of undivided
loyalty, confidentiality, and competent representation to the child
as is due an adult client.”114
The ABA Attorney Standards recognize that a child involved
in abuse and neglect proceedings has “discrete and independent
views” and direct the appointed attorney to advance the child’s
wishes and opinions by advocating for the child’s articulated posi-
tion.115  However, the ABA Attorney Standards also acknowledge
the diversity of approaches to child representation that are codified
throughout the country and suggest that a traditional legal interest
model may be unachievable in exceptional cases.116  While setting
forth clear principles, definitions, and expectations for attorneys
who represent children in abuse and neglect proceedings, the ABA
standards simultaneously reveal the inherent complexity in repre-
senting and giving voice to the country’s most vulnerable
children.117
C. Giving a Voice to Vulnerable Children: Pennsylvania’s TPR
Representation Scheme and the Need for Workable
Standards
1. Pennsylvania’s Statute Governing Representation in TPR
Proceedings
Prior to 1980, Pennsylvania’s children lacked a statutory right
to counsel during TPR proceedings.118  On two occasions in the late
1970s, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Mandarino published
passionate dissenting opinions reflecting on the significance of the
parent-child relationship, illuminating the potentially drastic results
113. Id. at 1 (“These standards . . . take the position that although a lawyer
may accept appointment in the dual capacity of a ‘lawyer/guardian ad litem,’ the
lawyer’s primary duty must still be focused on the protection of the legal rights of
the child client.”).
114. Id. at 2.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2–3.
117. See id. at 2–4 (setting forth the basic obligations of attorneys who re-
present children in child welfare proceedings and describing aspects of the client-
attorney relationship that are unique to representing children, including a child’s
susceptibility to manipulation and intimidation, the need for developmentally ap-
propriate communication, and the potential benefit of utilizing interdisciplinary
support from professionals like social workers throughout the representation).
118. In re Adoption of N.A.G., 471 A.2d 871, 875 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)
(“Prior to the passage of the Adoption Act in 1980, the appointment of counsel for
children who were the subject of involuntary termination proceedings was unnec-
essary as long as the parties and the trial court provided for their best interests.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\124-2\DIK204.txt unknown Seq: 18 11-FEB-20 11:05
448 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:431
of the TPR process and critiquing the absence of a statutory right to
counsel for children involved in TPR proceedings.119  Justice
Mandarino underlined the unrealistic presumption that “somehow
all of the child’s interests [will] be advanced” without a statutorily-
mandated right to counsel.120  Emphasizing the “serious injustice”
of denying a child legal representation, Justice Mandarino noted
that, “[w]hen parental rights are being terminated, so too are the
rights of the child.”121
Seemingly in response to Justice Mandarino’s arguments,122
the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted 23 PA. CONST. STAT.
§ 2313(a),123 setting forth a mandatory requirement for courts to
appoint legal counsel for children involved in contested TPR pro-
ceedings.124  During the process of enacting Section 2313(a), Penn-
sylvania legislators debated the logistics of the representation
mandate, particularly in cases involving young or preverbal chil-
dren.125  One representative proposed an amendment to strike Sec-
tion 2313(a)’s mandatory language, arguing that the representation
requirement would result in unnecessary costs and expenses while
complicating the dynamics of TPR proceedings.126  However, after
further debate, during which a proponent of Section 2313(a) em-
phasized the significance of the TPR process, the General Assem-
bly passed Section 2313(a) with its current mandatory language.127
After the General Assembly enacted Section 2313(a), the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted the statute as a means of
ensuring that children’s needs and interests are “advanced actively
119. In re Kapcsos, 360 A.2d 174, 180 (Pa. 1976) (Manderino, J., dissenting);
In re Thomas, 399 A.2d 1063, 1064 (Pa. 1979) (Manderino, J., dissenting).
120. Thomas, 399 A.2d at 1064.
121. Id.
122. Adoption of N.A.G., 417 A.2d at 875 n.2 (asserting that Section 2313(a)’s
“statutory requirement that counsel be appointed appears to have been the legisla-
ture’s response” to Justice Manderino’s dissenting opinions).
123. Adoption Act of 1980, P.L. No. 163, § 1 (1980) (codified at 23 PA.
CONST. STAT. § 2313(a) (2014)).
124. Id.
125. LEGIS. JOURNAL, H.R. 164-48, 1st Sess., at 1582–83 (Pa. June 16, 1980).
126. LEGIS. JOURNAL, H.R. 164-48, 1st Sess., at 1582 (Pa. June 16, 1980)
(statement of Rep. Dorr) (presenting an amendment to strike the mandatory rep-
resentation provision of Section 2313(a) because “in most cases these children are
infants” whose “interests are protected by the law in that the court is required . . .
to do what is best for the child”).
127. LEGIS. JOURNAL, H.R. 164-48, 1st Sess., at 1582 (Pa. June 16, 1980)
(statement of Rep. Schweder) (opposing the amendment to strike Section
2313(a)’s mandatory representation provision and explaining that the termination
of the rights of a child’s parent is “the most important decision that faces [the
child] certainly for the rest of [the child’s] life”).
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by an advocate whose loyalty [is] owed exclusively to them.”128
Additionally, the court affirmed the mandatory nature of Section
2313(a)’s representation provision, establishing that a court’s failure
to appoint counsel for children pursuant to Section 2313(a) is a re-
versible error.129
2. The Statute Applied: Section 2313(a)’s Mandate as a Source of
Instability in Pennsylvania’s TPR Process
Though Section 2313(a)’s representation provisions are
mandatory, Pennsylvania’s courts have struggled to develop a con-
clusive and consistent understanding of the role that a child’s Sec-
tion 2313(a) attorney must play.130  In March 2017, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court published its In re L.B.M. opinion,131
which analyzed the proper role of Section 2313(a) counsel.132  The
court began its inquiry by pointing to the two categories of chil-
dren’s interests that are recognized in the legal field:  the child’s
legal interest, which is the child’s own preferred outcome; and the
child’s best interest, which is determined by the court throughout
the dependency and TPR process.133  After parsing Section
2313(a)’s representation provision, a majority of the court con-
cluded that the statute’s mandate is unambiguous and that the Gen-
eral Assembly’s use of the term “counsel” requires a lawyer who
represents the child’s legal interests and who is directed by the
child.134  Throughout its decision, the court emphasized the General
128. In re Adoption of N.A.G., 417 A.2d 871, 874 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
129. In re E.F.H., 751 A.2d 1186, 1189–90 (Pa. 2000) (reviewing Section
2313(a)’s directive that “the court ‘shall’ appoint . . . counsel,” concluding that such
language is mandatory, and holding that failure to appoint counsel pursuant to
Section 2313(a) is a “reversible error of law”).
130. Compare In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012), with In re Adop-
tion of L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172 (Pa. 2017), and In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080 (Pa. 2018).
In K.M., the Pennsylvania Superior Court determined that Section 2313(a)’s provi-
sions are ambiguous regarding whether an attorney-GAL can serve as a child’s
legal counsel pursuant to Section 2313(a). K.M., 53 A.3d at 787.  In contrast, the
L.B.M. court concluded that Section 2313(a) was unambiguous in its mandate for
client-centered legal representation and that failure to appoint legal counsel was
reversible error. Adoption of L.B.M., 161 A.3d at 180.  However, L.B.M. was a
fractured plurality decision in which the court failed to clarify the process of how a
trial court should appoint Section 2313(a) counsel and whether an attorney-GAL
could fill the role. Id. at 181, 184, 188, 193.  Finally, the T.S. court concluded that,
“where there is a conflict between the child’s legal interests and his best interest,”
Section 2313(a) requires the court to appoint separate counsel to represent each
interest. T.S., 192 A.3d at 1082.
131. In re Adoption of L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172 (Pa. 2017).
132. Id. at 174.
133. Id. at 174–75.
134. Id. at 179–80.
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Assembly’s intent to protect a child’s interests by enacting Section
2313(a), which “codified a process that affords a full and fair oppor-
tunity for all of the affected parties to be heard and to participate in
a TPR proceeding.”135
Importantly, though the L.B.M. court issued a majority opin-
ion regarding Section 2313(a)’s mandatory requirement for legal
counsel, the court was significantly divided about whether a single
attorney-guardian ad litem (“attorney-GAL”) could simultaneously
represent a child’s best and legal interests.136  Three justices asser-
tively declared that an attorney-GAL, appointed to represent the
child during the dependency process and tasked with representing a
child’s best interest, could not satisfy Section 2313(a)’s mandate for
child-centered legal counsel.137  However, four justices argued that
an attorney-GAL representing both the child’s best and legal inter-
ests could satisfy Section 2313(a)’s mandate, so long as the child’s
legal interests did not diverge from the outcome that was in the
child’s best interests.138
In the months following the fractured L.B.M. decision, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court heard at least 75 appeals of involun-
tary TPR decrees and addressed, among other issues, whether the
trial courts had appointed appropriate counsel for the children in-
volved in the TPR proceedings.139  Between April 2017 and August
2018, the Pennsylvania Superior Court remanded many TPR ap-
peals, concluding that the lower court contravened Section 2313(a)
by failing to ensure that counsel adequately represented the child’s
135. Id. at 183.
136. Id. at 180–82, 184–93.
137. Id. at 181.
138. Id. at 184 (Saylor, J., concurring) (arguing that the decision to appoint an
attorney-GAL to represent both a child’s best and legal interests “should be deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis, subject to the familiar and well-settled conflict of
interest analysis”); id. at 185 (Baer, J., dissenting) (concluding that Section 2313(a)
“does not mandate the appointment of counsel distinct from” the attorney-GAL
“absent a conflict of interest between the child’s best interests and legal interests”);
id. at 192–93 (Mundy, J., dissenting) (arguing that Section 2313(a) does not require
appointment of a second attorney “when a GAL attorney already represented the
children in accordance with Section 2313(a)”).
139. See, e.g., In re K.L., Nos. 140-42 WDA 2018, 2018 WL 3341925, at n.2, 3
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2018); In re B.G.G., No. 3713 EDA 2017, 2018 WL 2111015, at *2–3
(Pa. Super. Ct. May 8, 2018); In re Adoption of A.R.H., No. 1024 MDA 2017, 2018
WL 1404593, at *4 (Pa. Super. Ct. Mar. 21, 2018); In re J.W., No. 1385 WDA 2017,
2018 WL 1062687, at *3 (Pa. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2018); In re N.H., No. 73 WDA
2017, 2017 WL 4179728, at *6 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sep. 21, 2017); In re J.W., No. 389
WDA 2017, 2017 WL 3725277, at *5–6 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 30, 3017); In re D.L.B.,
166 A.3d 322, 329 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 15, 2017); In re C.P.W., Nos. 276–279 WDA
2017, 2017 WL 2116955, at *12 (Pa. Super. Ct. May 15, 2017).
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legal interests.140  Collectively, these TPR appeals illuminate the in-
conclusive nature of the L.B.M. decision and evidence the confu-
sion and instability faced by lower courts attempting to apply
L.B.M.’s fractured reasoning to the facts of specific TPR cases.141
In August 2018, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court published In
re T.S.,142 a second decision interpreting Section 2313(a)’s repre-
sentation mandate.  The court began the opinion by reflecting on
L.B.M., clarifying points of consensus from the plurality decision:
(1) Section 2313(a) requires the court to appoint legal counsel for
children in involuntary TPR proceedings; (2) when there is a con-
flict between a child’s legal and best interests, an attorney-GAL
cannot represent both interests; and (3) failure to appoint separate
counsel to represent each interest when a child’s best interest di-
verges from their expressed interest constitutes structural error.143
In an effort to clarify any lingering ambiguities and to resolve
the case at bar, which involved questions about the proper repre-
sentation of two preverbal children, the T.S. court also concluded
that, “[a]s a matter of sound logic, there can be no conflict between
an attorney’s duty to advance a subjective preference on the child’s
part” when the child is incapable of expressing his or her own de-
sired outcome.144  In other words, the court held that, in the case of
preverbal children, Section 2313(a) does not require a court to ap-
point a second lawyer to advance the child’s “unknowable
preference.”145
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Wecht criticized the majority’s
reasoning, particularly the presumption against the possibility of
140. See, e.g., In re A.A.O., Nos. 154–158 EDA 2018, 2018 WL 3490998, at
*2–4 (Pa. Super. Ct. July 20, 2018) (remanding the case because the court was
“unable to discern whether counsel adequately considered each Child’s individual
legal interest, in addition to his or her best interest”); In re D.M.C., 192 A.3d 1207,
1213 (Pa. Super. Ct. July 9, 2018) (remanding the TPR decree based on the inabil-
ity “to determine from the record whether Children received the benefit of their
statutorily-required right to client-directed counsel serving their legal interests”);
In re J.R.L., No. 1630 WDA 2017, 2018 WL 2376617, at *2–3 (Pa. Super. Ct. May
25, 2018) (remanding the trial court’s TPR decree for failure to appoint Section
2313(a) counsel); In re N.S.S., No. 1342 MDA 2017, 2018 WL 831827, at *1 (Pa.
Super. Ct. Feb. 13, 2018) (vacating and remanding the TPR decree based on the
observation “that the trial court failed to appoint legal counsel to represent Child’s
legal interests as required” under Section 2313(a)).
141. See supra note 138.
142. In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080 (Pa. 2018), petition for cert. denied, T.H.-H. v.
Allegheny Cty. Off. of Children, Youth and Families, 139 S. Ct. 1187 (Feb. 19,
2019).
143. Id. at 1082.
144. Id. at 1090.
145. Id.
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conflict in cases involving preverbal children.146  Justice Wecht ar-
gued that “[t]he Majority’s approach ensures that any such conflicts
will likely be obscured and overlooked, and effectively validates
post hoc justifications for trial court violations of Section 2313(a)’s
commands.  At best, today’s Majority has failed to provide ade-
quate guidance for determining whether a conflict in fact exists.”147
In the four months following T.S., Justice Wecht’s concerns were
shown to be well-founded.  From August 2018 through December
2018, the Pennsylvania Superior Court remanded over 25 TPR de-
crees involving children ages 3 through 13 because the trial court
failed to determine whether the child’s best and legal interests di-
verged and, therefore, did not comply with Section 2313(a)’s repre-
sentation mandate as interpreted by the T.S. court.148
III. ANALYSIS
Between March 2017 and the publication of this Comment, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed approximately 170 TPR ap-
peals and remanded approximately 40 TPR decrees based on the
trial courts’ noncompliance with Section 2313(a).149  In many of
these remands, the Superior Court instructed the trial court to first
determine the child’s legal interest, and then, if necessary, to con-
duct a new TPR hearing with the child’s legal interest repre-
sented.150  Therefore, the inability of courts to effectively and
consistently assess children’s best and legal interests and to thereaf-
ter appoint appropriate representation has created additional insta-
bility in the lives of vulnerable children by prolonging the TPR
146. Id. at 1099–1100.
147. Id. at 1101 (Wecht, J., dissenting).
148. See, e.g., In re A.F.F., No. 1164 WDA 2018, 2018 WL 6629164, at *2 (Pa.
Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2018); In re A.M.R., No. 1367 EDA 2018, 2018 WL 5905934, at
*2–3 (Pa. Super. Ct. Nov. 9, 2018); In re C.J.L., No. 168, 174 EDA 2018, 2018 WL
4922801, at *6–7 (Pa. Super. Ct. Oct. 10, 2018); Adoption of M.S., No. 305 MDA
2018, 2018 WL 4201781, at *3–4 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sep. 4, 2018).
149. Data collected from Westlaw’s index of cases citing 23 PA. CONST. STAT.
§ 2313(a) (2014) by reviewing and tallying citing references from March 2017
through August 2019.
150. See, e.g., In re P.G.F., No. 1464 WDA 2018, 2019 WL 1199986, at *4 (Pa.
Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 2019) (remanding the case as directing the lower court to “as-
certain [the] [c]hild’s preferred outcome” and, if necessary, conduct a new termina-
tion hearing); In re Q.R.D., No. 1060 MDA 2018, 2018 WL 6735024, at *4 (Pa.
Super. Ct. Dec. 24, 2018).  On remand, the Pennsylvania Superior Court instructed
the trial court to “determine whether a conflict existed between Child’s best inter-
ests and legal interests, if ascertainable.” Id.  Then, “if a conflict is found to exist,
the court shall reappoint legal counsel for the child, as well as a separate GAL, and
conduct a new hearing in order to serve the substantive purpose of providing Child
with an opportunity to advance his legal interests through his new counsel.” Id.
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process and complicating efforts to establish permanent place-
ments.151  Because the Superior Court remanded many TPR de-
crees after the T.S. decision, the presumption that young or
preverbal children’s best and legal interests cannot diverge is
neither a straightforward nor a uniformly-applicable solution.152
Collectively, the numerous remanded TPR decrees establish
that Section 2313(a)’s representation mandate is ripe for judicial
and legislative intervention.  Judicial procedures must be effectu-
ated to eliminate the rampant confusion over the role of Section
2313(a) counsel, to clarify TPR court records, and to minimize the
likelihood of subsequent remands for lack of compliance with Sec-
tion 2313(a).  The General Assembly must also codify provisions
that clarify the responsibilities of Section 2313(a) attorneys in cases
involving both preverbal and older children.
A. Clarifying the Role of Section 2313(a) Advocates Through
Judicial Procedure
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has clarified that Section
2313(a)’s mandate unambiguously requires “the appointment of
counsel who serves the child’s legal interests” as distinct from an
attorney-GAL tasked with representing a child’s best interest.153
While the T.S. court minimized the difficulty that may arise when
an attorney-GAL serves as a Section 2313(a) attorney,154 the pleth-
ora of remanded TPR decrees supports a careful, cautious, and in-
formed approach to appointing Section 2313(a) counsel.155
151. See T.S., 192 A.3d at 1104 (Wecht, J., dissenting) (recognizing the tension
between “delivering permanency . . . without undue delay” and the duty of the
courts not to “overlook . . . the right to counsel that the General Assembly has
bestowed” to children involved in contested TPR proceedings); see also MICHAEL
E. LAMB, ET. AL., Children and the Law, in HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY
AND DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE, vol. 3, at 496 (7th ed., 2015) (discussing the im-
portance of developing child welfare interventions designed to minimize disruption
to the attachment a child shares with his or her parent or caregiver).
152. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
153. In re Adoption of L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172, 180 (Pa. 2017).
154. T.S., 192 A.3d at 1100 (Wecht, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[t]he Major-
ity’s desire to foster ‘continuity of representation’” by allowing the attorney-GAL
from the dependency stage to serve as the child’s Section 2313(a) attorney “does
not ameliorate” the “‘two-hat’ problem” arising from such dual representation).
155. In re Adoption of T.M.L.M., 184 A.3d 585, 588 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018).  A
three-judge panel determined that the court “must raise the failure to appoint stat-
utorily-required counsel for children sua sponte, as children are unable to raise the
issue on their own behalf due to their minority.” Id.  In September 2019, the Supe-
rior Court overruled T.M.L.M., holding that “the Superior Court only has the au-
thority to raise sua sponte the issue of whether the lower court appointed any
counsel for the child, and not the authority to delve into the quality of the repre-
sentation.” In re Adoption of K.M.G., Nos. 580–583 WDA 2018, 2019 WL
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The plurality in L.B.M. strongly cautioned against appointing a
dependency attorney-GAL as a Section 2313(a) attorney.156  The
court highlighted the nuanced yet vital differences between the
roles each advocate plays and warned of the confusion that may
arise from appointing an attorney-GAL as a Section 2313(a) attor-
ney.157  In many of the opinions that resulted in remanded TPR
decrees, the Superior Court critiqued attorneys who previously
served in a GAL role during dependency proceedings but had tran-
sitioned to the role of Section 2313(a) counsel in the TPR process
for their failure “to clearly convey [the child’s] preferred outcome,
focusing instead on [the child’s] best interests.”158
To avoid future instability in the TPR process, the child’s Sec-
tion 2313(a) attorney must fulfill the role of traditional legal coun-
sel by focusing on ascertaining the child’s legal interest or preferred
outcome.159  Therefore, if a child’s dependency attorney-GAL sub-
sequently serves as the child’s Section 2313(a) attorney during TPR
proceedings, the attorney must decisively shift his or her focus; be-
cause an attorney-GAL is ultimately a best interest attorney, the
attorney must make it clear to his or her client that, as the child’s
Section 2313(a) attorney, the attorney’s role has changed.160  As le-
4392506, at *2 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sept. 13, 2019).  The Superior Court suggested that it
does not need to raise the issue sua sponte because of “numerous protections [that]
exist to ensure that the GAL does not have a conflict at an involuntary termination
hearing,” including the GAL’s professional responsibility obligation to alert the
court of a conflict. Id. at *4.  However, the sheer number of remanded cases based
on noncompliance with Section 2313(a) may indicate that these alleged “protec-
tions” are insufficient. See, e.g., supra note 140.  Although the K.M.G. decision
may reduce the number of remanded cases and quell the signs of instability high-
lighted herein, Pennsylvania’s children are now more at risk for losing their statu-
torily-mandated right to counsel, which is arguably more problematic than the
plethora of remands caused by sua sponte review.  Thus, trial courts must develop
standards and procedures to protect children’s rights under Section 2313(a). See
infra Part III.A.
156. Adoption of L.B.M., 161 A.3d at 181.
157. Id.
158. In re J.L., No. 82 MDA 2018, 2018 WL 4519848, at *3 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sep.
21, 2018); see also, e.g., In re C.M., No. 1900 WDA 2017, 2018 WL 6004782, at *3
(Pa. Super. Ct. Nov. 15, 2018) (remanding the TPR decree after the appointed
Section 2313(a) attorney “declined to inquire about [the child’s] preference” and
“unilaterally pursued” what the attorney “deemed to be [the child’s] best
interests”).
159. See Adoption of L.B.M., 161 A.3d at 180 (emphasizing the difference
between the role of an attorney-GAL and legal counsel).
160. See Emily Buss, “You’re My What?” The Problem of Children’s Mis-
perceptions of Their Lawyers’ Roles, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699, 1712 (1996) (ex-
plaining that, “[u]nless the child client understands that his lawyer will zealously
advocate his positions, he will have no incentive to invest the time in client-lawyer
consultations necessary for good, informed decision making, let alone the incentive
to turn to his lawyer for advice, including advice involving confidential matters”).
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gal counsel, the child’s Section 2313(a) attorney’s role is to provide
child-centered, child-directed advocacy.161
While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has established that a
complete prohibition against an attorney-GAL serving as Section
2313(a) counsel is too restrictive, the T.S. approach is arguably also
inadequate in its absence of workable standards.162  Pennsylvania
trial courts should adopt procedures focused on clarifying the role
of a child’s Section 2313(a) attorney and developing a record of
both the attorney’s role and the child’s best and legal interests.  The
following procedure provides an approach that effectuates the pur-
pose and plain meaning of Section 2313(a).
Immediately after a TPR petition is filed and the child’s par-
ents contest the termination,163 the trial court should schedule a
hearing (“Representation Hearing”) to appoint a Section 2313(a)
attorney.164  If an attorney-GAL represented the child during the
dependency process, the court should require that attorney to file a
brief detailing the attorney’s understanding of the role of a Section
2313(a) legal advocate,165 the steps that the attorney has taken to
determine the child’s legal interest,166 and a description of the
child’s preferred outcome.167  Additionally, the brief should assert
161. ABA ATTORNEY STANDARDS, supra note 10, at 2.
162. See T.S., 192 A.3d at 1101 (Wecht, J., dissenting).
163. See MODEL ACT GOVERNING THE REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN
ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS, § 3(a) (AM. BAR ASSOCIA-
TION 2011), https://bit.ly/37eqzt5 [https://perma.cc/6X63-YGAC] [hereinafter
MODEL ACT GOVERNING REPRESENTATION] (“The appointment of a child’s law-
yer must be made as soon as practicable to ensure effective representation of the
child . . . .”).
164. In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1103 (Pa. 2018) (Wecht, J., dissenting) (explain-
ing that “it is the trial court’s duty to determine, following argument and likely
following [a] hearing, whether the attorney-GAL can continue as legal counsel or
whether a new attorney must be appointed”).  This procedure is particularly im-
portant in light of the court’s recent decision in In re Adoption of K.M.G. In re
Adoption of K.M.G., Nos. 580–583 WDA 2018, 2019 WL 4392506, at *4 (Pa.
Super. Ct. Sept. 13, 2019). See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
165. In re A.F., Nos. 589–592 WDA 2018, 2018 WL 4404354, at *9 (Pa. Super.
Ct. Sep. 17, 2018) (Strassburger, J., concurring) (“I use this opportunity to point
out that it is best practice for attorneys . . . to place on the record a brief explana-
tion of . . . the capacity in which the attorney represents the child, and whether the
attorney is advocating for a child’s preferred outcome, best interests, or both.”).
166. ABA ATTORNEY STANDARDS, supra note 10, at 4 (requiring the use of
developmentally appropriate interviewing techniques).
167. See, e.g., In re A.D., No. 1183 MDA 2018, 2018 WL 6259207, at *4 (Pa.
Super. Ct. Nov. 30, 2018) (noting that “[t]he record is silent as to whether [the
attorney] ascertained the preferred outcome of [the child]” and that the attorney
“failed to file a brief . . . or join the brief of another party”); In re J.M.H., Nos.
1925, 1930, 1931 EDA 2018, 2018 WL 6521064, at *4 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 2018)
(explaining that the Section 2313(a) attorney was present at the hearing but failed
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whether the attorney believes the child’s best interest diverges from
the child’s preferred outcome—e.g., if the child’s preferred out-
come is likely to put the child at risk of danger or harm such that
the court should appoint a separate attorney-GAL to represent the
child’s best interest.168
During the Representation Hearing, the court should review
with the attorney the expectations of a Section 2313(a) attorney by
clarifying that the required role of a Section 2313(a) attorney is a
client-centered advocate rather than a best interest GAL.169  Ulti-
mately, the information presented during the Representation Hear-
ing should allow the court to determine whether the attorney-GAL
can successfully serve as the child’s Section 2313(a) attorney or
whether the child’s legal interests must be represented by a newly-
appointed, child-centered attorney.170
The court should take special care to clarify the role of counsel
if the client is very young or preverbal.171  As part of the Represen-
tation Hearing, the court should make an on-the-record inquiry into
the child’s capacity to express a legal interest or preferred out-
come,172 ensuring that the attorney’s brief outlines the developmen-
tally-appropriate steps taken to determine the child’s legal interest
or inability to express a preferred outcome.  Additionally, the court
should reiterate the protracted nature of the TPR process, inform-
to argue the child’s preferred outcome, failed to indicate whether the attorney had
ascertained the preferred outcome, and failed to file a brief).
168. ABA ATTORNEY STANDARDS, supra note 10, at 8.
169. T.S., 192 A.3d at 1103 (Wecht, J., dissenting) (“Following argument (and,
preferably, hearing) on the conflict inquiry, the trial court must ensure that the
child’s right to counsel is protected and must remind all involved that, if the attor-
ney-GAL is permitted to serve as the Section 2313(a) legal counsel, her role has
changed from representing best interests to representing legal interests.”).
170. See In re L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172, 180 (Pa. 2017) (explaining that, “when a
child’s relationship with his or her birth family could be severed permanently and
against the wishes of the parents, the legislature made the policy judgement . . .
that a lawyer who represents the child’s legal interests, and who is directed by the
child, is a necessity”); see also DUQUETTE, supra note 109, at  2–3 (arguing that,
because the “American legal system is based on the premise that parties have a
due process right to be heard and that competing independent advocacy produces
just results in each case,” competent representation is “crucial for the child” to
allow the judge to make informed decisions about the child’s future).
171. See T.S., 192 A.3d at 1102 (Wecht, J., dissenting) (rejecting a “bright
line” approach and suggesting that “[t]he trial court, which can observe the chil-
dren closely and hear testimony about their particular abilities and circumstances,
must do so”).
172. In re A.F., Nos. 589–592 WDA 2018, 2018 WL 4404354, at *9 (Pa. Super.
Ct. Sep. 17, 2018) (Strassburger, J., concurring) (“The child has a statutory right to
client-directed counsel who must advocate solely for the child’s preferred outcome
. . . [t]hus, it is important that the record is clear as to what position the attorney is
advancing.”).
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ing the child’s Section 2313(a) attorney of the need to regularly re-
visit the child’s ability to express a legal interest or preferred
outcome.173
B. Legislating a Presumption of Capacity
Though the T.S. court held that a young or preverbal child can-
not have a legal interest separate from the child’s best interest,174
this presumption is arguably oversimplified175 and contravenes the
plain meaning of Section 2313(a).176
Importantly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has established
neither a bright-line age at which a court may presume that a child
has the ability to profess a preferred outcome nor a definition of
“preverbal” to guide trial courts.177  Several of the cases in which
the Pennsylvania Superior Court remanded TPR decrees for lack of
compliance with Section 2313(a) involve children as young as four-
years-old, suggesting that even very young children may possess the
173. See In re Adoption of L.L., Nos. 1882–1883 MDA 2017, 2018 WL
6288167, at *4 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 2018) (noting that a child involved in the
TPR proceedings had aged while the TPR appeal was pending and, consequently,
directing the trial court to determine whether the child’s “legal interests diverge
from her best interests” on remand); see also ABA ATTORNEY STANDARDS, supra
note 10, at 6 (rejecting the idea that “children of certain ages . . . lack capacity to
determine their position in litigation” and advocating instead for a recognition that
a child’s disability is “contextual, incremental, and may be intermittent”); see also
Linda D. Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers for Children: It Is the “Right” Thing To
Do, 27 PACE L. REV. 869, 913 (2007) (stating that “capacity is an evolving process
and is contextual”).
174. T.S., 192 A.3d at 1090.
175. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).  In Troxel, Justice Ste-
vens issued a dissenting opinion, remarking that, while the Supreme Court
has not yet had occasion to elucidate the nature of a child’s liberty inter-
ests in preserving established familial or family-like bonds . . . it seems to
me extremely likely that, to the extent parents and families have funda-
mental liberty interests in preserving such intimate relationships, so, too,
do children have these interests, and so, too, must their interests be bal-
anced in the equation.
Id. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  The T.S. presumption is arguably directly con-
trary to this proposition. See T.S., 192 A.3d at 1092.  Justice Wecht’s dissent in T.S.
reflects calls for a more nuanced approach, stating “I do not support a presump-
tion that a pre-verbal child’s legal interests always dovetail with the child’s best
interests . . . . Nor do I support a presumption that a pre-verbal child’s legal inter-
ests always equate with preservation of the putative familial bond.” Id. at 1101
(Wecht, J., dissenting).
176. See In re Adoption of L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172, 179–80 (Pa. 2017).
177. In re Adoption of L.L., Nos. 1882–1883 MDA 2017, 2018 WL 6288167, at
*2 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 2018) (explaining that the question of “how young is too
young . . . is a “question this Court has grappled with” since the court’s decision in
L.B.M.).  Though the L.L. Court characterized the T.S. presumption as a means of
bringing the “line of demarcation into focus,” arguably the concepts of “young”
and “preverbal” are also exceptionally vague and variable. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\124-2\DIK204.txt unknown Seq: 28 11-FEB-20 11:05
458 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:431
ability to express a preferred outcome.178  A presumption that ef-
fectively negates 2313(a)’s legal representation requirement is,
therefore, inadequate to address the complexity of child compe-
tency and will result in additional remanded TPR decrees or depri-
vation of statutorily-protected legal representation.179  This
subsection outlines an alternative approach, proposing that a
nuanced, client-specific procedure for determining a child’s ability
to express a preferred outcome would allow for increased efficiency
in the TPR process.
To effectuate the purpose and plain meaning of Section
2313(a),180 the General Assembly should clearly delineate the re-
sponsibilities of a Section 2313(a) attorney by amending the current
Juvenile Court rules181 to set forth the duties of a Section 2313(a)
attorney.  The General Assembly should enact representation stan-
dards that call for an approach consistent with Pennsylvania’s Rule
of Professional Conduct 1.14,182 which requires an attorney to begin
each representation with a presumption of client capacity, main-
taining a normal client-lawyer relationship as far as reasonably pos-
sible.183  While determining a child’s capacity to direct counsel is
often difficult,184 Section 2313(a)’s mandate for traditional legal
178. See, e.g., In re J.M.H., Nos. 1925, 1930, 1931 EDA 2018, 2018 WL
6521064, at *4 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 2018) (remanding a TPR decree terminating
the rights of a parent of a four-year-old child because the child had no indications
of being nonverbal and yet the record did not state the child’s preferred outcome).
179. See LAMB, supra note 151, at 464 (defining “children” as inclusive of “in-
fants, toddlers, preschoolers, school-aged children, youth, and adolescents” and ex-
plaining that “[t]ogether, they are characterized by an extremely diverse and broad
array of emerging cognitive, social, and emotional abilities,” a fact which “compli-
cates researchers’ understandings of children’s involvement, participation, and un-
derstanding of their roles in legal contexts”).
180. See In re Adoption of L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172, 179–80 (Pa. 2017) (explain-
ing that “the recognized purpose of [Section 2313(a)] is to ensure that the needs
and welfare of the children involved are actively advanced” and holding that the
statute clearly and unambiguously “requires the appointment of counsel who
serves the child’s legal interests”).
181. See PA. R.J.C.P. 1154.  Rule 1154 sets forth detailed expectations and
responsibilities of a GAL only. Id. The General Assembly should add a rule gov-
erning the role and responsibilities of Section 2313(a) attorneys.
182. PA. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.14, Client with Diminished Capacity (2018).
183. PA. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.14(a); Elrod, supra note 173, at 912–14 (“To
ensure the child’s voice is heard, we need to reverse the presumption of incapacity
and start with a presumption of capacity.”).
184. See Barbara A. Atwood, Representing Children Who Can’t or Won’t Di-
rect Counsel: Best Interest Lawyering or No Lawyering at All?, 53 ARIZ. L. REV.
381, 408–10 (2011) (describing the “protracted process” of child development and
explaining that “[l]egal representation of a child—an individual who is in a state of
becoming—is challenging precisely because of the fluid nature of children’s identi-
ties”); see also DUQUETTE, supra note 109, at 59 (“The question of competency and
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representation requires an individualized, client-specific review of
each child’s ability to express a legal interest or preferred out-
come.185  Therefore, Rule 1.14(a)’s direction for attorneys to at-
tempt to maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship despite a
client’s young age is an appropriate guidepost for the Pennsylvania
courts and General Assembly.186
The Comment to Rule 1.14 sets forth a nuanced, case-by-case
framework through which an attorney must carefully ascertain the
child client’s ability to comprehend, process, and reflect on the TPR
proceeding.187  The ABA Attorney Standards build upon this
framework, explaining the attorney’s duty to “learn how to ask de-
velopmentally appropriate questions and how to interpret the
child’s responses.”188  Pennsylvania’s General Assembly should en-
act legislation and court rules that require Section 2313(a) attorneys
to demonstrate that, at a bare minimum, the attorney attempted to
discern the child client’s position and follow the child’s direction.189
C. Utilizing the Legal Interest Model for Preverbal Children
The ABA Attorney Standards acknowledge the unique chal-
lenge of representing preverbal children, a task which strains the
contours of a normal client-attorney relationship.190  Despite this
challenge, Pennsylvania’s General Assembly should demand a
model of representation for preverbal children that most closely ap-
maturity is an evolving and elusive judgment that . . . psychologists have a difficult
time making.”).
185. See In re A.F.F., No. 1164 WDA 2018, 2018 WL 6629164, at *2 (Pa.
Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2018) (calling for direct interviews with child clients to ascer-
tain preferred outcomes); In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1096 (Pa. 2018) (Donohue, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (explaining that “[children] unquestionably ha[ve] an
interest in the outcome of a termination decision, as it dictates . . . whether the
parent/child relationship will remain intact” and that the Pennsylvania General
Assembly “recognized [the child’s] . . . protectable legal interest” by requiring the
court to appoint legal representation for the child).
186. PA. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.14(a) (“When a client’s capacity to make ade-
quately considered decisions . . . is diminished . . . because of minority . . . the
lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer rela-
tionship with the client.”).
187. PA. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.14(a), cmt. 1.
188. ABA ATTORNEY STANDARDS, supra note 10, at 3–4.
189. In re Adoption of T.M.L.M., 184 A.3d 585, 590 (Pa. 2018), overruled on
other grounds by In re Adoption of K.M.G., Nos. 580–583 WDA 2018, 2019 WL
4392506, at *4 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sept. 13, 2019); Elrod, supra note 173, at 915 (noting
that ABA standards “require that the lawyer must meet and get to know the child”
and recommending that “the lawyer knows as much as possible about the child
client, the child’s developmental stage, the child’s family, the child’s activities and
interests, and the child’s needs”).
190. ABA ATTORNEY STANDARDS, supra note 10, at 3–4.
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proximates a traditional client-attorney relationship.191  While the
T.S. majority opinion presents a compelling and logical argument
that Section 2313(a) does not require an attorney to advance a
preverbal child’s “unknowable preference,”192 the choice to resort
to best interest advocacy is arguably unnecessary.193  Importantly,
the best interest model has come under increasing scrutiny because
of its endorsement of “substituted judgment” by lawyers, the con-
cept of removing from the judge the power to determine the out-
come that is in a child’s best interest and placing it instead with
legal advocates who may lack expertise in child development and
complex child welfare issues.194
Though a best interest model may initially appear to be the
most natural alternative to a traditional legal interest model, the
ABA Standards presents a third approach:  the Legal Interest
Model.195  The Legal Interest Model recognizes that, even if a child
is unable or unwilling to express a preference about particular is-
sues in the case, the child nonetheless has a variety of legal and
procedural rights throughout the TPR process.196  Instead of devel-
oping solely a best interest theory, the preverbal child’s attorney is
tasked with pressing for all of the legal and statutory rights availa-
ble to the child.197
In addition to aligning with Section 2313(a)’s intent to provide
legal counsel to all children involved in contested TPR proceedings,
the Legal Interest Model also squares with Pennsylvania’s Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.14(b).198  Rule 1.14(b) requires legal coun-
sel to remain in a traditional attorney role but allows the attorney
to take protective action when working with a very young client
191. See In re Adoption of L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172, 179–80 (Pa. 2017); In re
Adoption of N.A.G., 471 A.2d 871, 874 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
192. In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1090 (Pa. 2018).
193. See Kelly and LeVezu, supra note 11, at 414 (recognizing that the inabil-
ity of very young children “to verbalize their needs makes them particularly vul-
nerable” but that such vulnerability does “not necessitate the granting of the
extreme power that is currently bestowed on best-interest attorneys”).
194. Id. at 392; DUQUETTE, supra note 109, at 20 (outlining criticisms of the
best interest model, particularly that “attorneys lack expertise required to ade-
quately determine children’s interests, because legal training does not prepare a
person to make the nuanced judgments the determination requires”).
195. See ABA ATTORNEY STANDARDS, supra note 10, at 8 (setting forth the
concept that, “[t]o the extent that a child does not or will not express a preference
about particular issues, the child’s attorney should determine and advocate the
child’s legal interests”); see also Kelly and LeVezu, supra note 11, at 392 (discuss-
ing the ABA’s Legal Interest model as “a third model of representation, that of
advancing only the child’s ‘legal interests’”).
196. Kelly and LeVezu, supra note 11, at 383.
197. Id. at 386.
198. PA. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.14(b).
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who is at risk of substantial physical or other harm, including by
seeking appointment of a GAL.199  When used in conjunction with
Rule 1.14(b), the Legal Interest Model simultaneously prohibits at-
torneys from substituting “their own judgment for that of the cli-
ent,”200 while allowing the attorney to involve additional services or
representatives to ensure that the child receives adequate
protection.201
Therefore, the General Assembly should require Section
2313(a) attorneys to advocate for the legal and procedural rights
available to children throughout the TPR process.202  Additionally,
the General Assembly should outline the dynamics and obligations
of the Legal Interest Model, including the ability of the Section
2313(a) attorney to petition the court for appointment of a GAL
pursuant to Model Rule 1.14(b).
IV. CONCLUSION
The involuntary TPR process can be fraught with trauma, pain,
and vulnerability.203  In addition to facing permanent separation
from their biological parents, children involved in the TPR process
must also wade through protracted and often complex court pro-
ceedings.204  Consequently, Pennsylvania’s General Assembly has
unambiguously codified a child’s right to be heard and represented
throughout the TPR process.205  However, the current instability
surrounding the application of Section 2313(a) effectively deprives
children of this statutory right and increases their experience of
instability.206
The General Assembly must, therefore, intervene by enacting
legislative guidance.207  This legislation must acknowledge the
199. Id.
200. Kelly and LeVezu, supra note 11, at 421–22.
201. See PA. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.14(b).
202. Kelly and LeVezu, supra note 11, at 386 (listing examples of legal and
procedural rights available to children involved in child welfare proceedings, in-
cluding “rights to services, to visits by caseworkers, and to placement preferences
that favor family”).
203. See Brief of Juvenile Law Cntr. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appel-
lant, In re Adoption of L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172 (Pa. 2017) (Nos. 84 & 85 MAP 2016),
at *15 (depicting the severity of the TRP process and outlining the associated
traumas and losses for the child, including the loss of the parent-child relationship,
the loss of the legal relationship to the child’s extended family members, and the
“risk of substitute care without a . . . permanent adoptive family”).
204. See supra Part II.A.2.
205. See supra Part II.C.1.
206. See supra Parts II.C.2. and III.A.
207. See supra Part III.
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range of children’s developmental stages,208 provide a procedural
framework for courts to use when appointing Section 2313(a) advo-
cates,209 and create standards for advocates to follow throughout
the representation process.210  Though the representation of chil-
dren undoubtedly presents unique challenges, the General Assem-
bly must amend Section 2313(a) so that courts and advocates can
use its representation provision to effectively give voice to one of
Pennsylvania’s most vulnerable populations.211
208. See supra Parts III.B. and III.C.
209. See supra Part III.
210. See supra Part III.A.
211. See supra Part II.C.
